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Abstract
The paper study how optimal abatement of CO2 emissions is a¤ected
by adjustment costs for investments in, and irreversibility of abatement
capital. Optimal abatement is determined by a Ramsey model for eco-
nomic growth, where uncertainy damage of climate change a¤ects pro-
ductivity. A numerical approximation of the solution of the dynamic
programming model in continuous time indicate that uncertainty leads to
a signi&cant reduction in the level of abatement. Compared with a model
that disregards adjustment costs and uncertainty, the level of emission
cuts is primarily a¤ected by the uncertainty, while the adjustment costs
may be decisive for the question of when emission ought to be reduced.
Irreversibility of abatement costs seems to have a limited impact on the
optimal policy.
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1 Introduction
One of the most di¢cult questions arising in designing climate policy is how to
encounter the large uncertainties. Although few question the possibility that
emissions of greenhouse gases may lead to climatic changes, it is hard to tell
what changes we may expect from given emission paths in the future. Future
emissions are uncertain, and the resulting concentrations of greenhouse gases in
the atmosphere are uncertain even if we knew the emissions with certainty. This
makes it di¢cult to predict radiative forcing, and there is considerable uncer-
tainty about the temperature change at a given level of forcing. However, these
uncertainties are small compared with those related to assessments of impacts.
In many cases, one have to limit the assessment of impacts to point out possible
impacts which may turn out to be serious, but is likely not to happen. For ex-
ample, there is a possibility that the Gulf current may be weakened signi&cantly
, and thereby leave Northern Europe colder as consequence of climate change.
However the chance is small, and if not, Europe is likely to turn warmer. As a
consequence, estimates of the economic damage of climate change are sub ject
to uncertainties larger than usual in economic analysis.
Recommendations for climate policy need not be based on damage assess-
ments, not at least because political targets, such as those in the Kyoto protocol,
are usually expressed in terms of current emissions. Most of the economic analy-
ses of climate policy have therefore focused on the question of achieving emission
targets under given constraints. On the other hand, one of the most important
questions remains how much of the emissions it is worthwhile to reduce. Con-
! icts among stakeholders may often be traced to this question, and the issue
will turn out increasingly important in the future if countries not committed by
the Kyoto protocol are to be included.
Whether to initiate early, aggressive actions to reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions, or to wait for more knowledge and perhaps obtain a lower degree of
uncertainty is frequently discussed in climate policy, which also embeds many
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other issues raised in investment theory. Once installed, abatement capital, such
as solar or wind power plants, cannot be utilised for alternative purposes, and
investments in these kinds of technologies has thereby got a certain degree of
irreversibity. In addition, substantial costs may be related to the implementa-
tion of the policy itself. Administration of indirect measures, such as targets or
markets for emissions quotas, are costly. In addition, some measures will have
to be carried out as public investments, thereby carrying with them a certain
cost of public funds, costs that can be interpreted as adjustment costs
In this paper climate policy is considered as an investment decision that may
be both irreversible and subject to adjustment costs. We integrate the unifying
approach to investment decisions proposed by Abel and Eberly [4] in a Ramsey
type of model for optimal growth, which includes feed-backs from the climate.
Uncertainty in abatement costs (or e¤ectiveness of abatement measures) and
uncertainty in the impacts of climate change are studied separately.
2 Adjustment costs and irreversibility in climate
policy
In neo-classical theory, investments is a mere derivation of the demand for cap-
ital in excess of the present stock. Investments is thereby determined by the
price of capital. Jorgenson [9] pointed out that &rms cannot instantaneously
adjust its capital stock without additional costs. Eisner and Strotz [7] showed
that frictions in the demand for capital may lead decision makers to give priority
to old technologies over new ones, because new technologies implies additional
costs related inter alia to installation, search and training. Therefore, a new
technology will not be preferred to an old one unless the prospects for the new
technology is strictly brighter than for the old. According to this theory, the de-
mand for capital cannot be modelled as a simple derivation from the production
function and the price of capital. There are certain resources foregone simply
as a result of the investment.
Adjustment costs may clearly be signi&cant for investments in climate mea-
sures. Maccini [11] classi&es adjustment costs into internal and external costs.
Internal adjustment costs include expenditures related to installation, training,
and reseach and development. These may be substantial for countries that in-
vest in climate measures. Over the past decade, emissions of CO2 have become
subject to great political concern, and is only beginning to represent a cost in
economic activities. The economic incentives for searching alternative technolo-
gies with lower emissions of CO2 are either recently implemented or not yet
feasible. The need for research is partly re! ected by the emphasis on climate
research in industrialised countries.
Also private industries are increasing their engagement in the search for
technologies that may reduce the emissions of CO2. An implementation of new
technologies requries training and will thereby add to the costs. Hence, CO2
measures include the same internal adjustment costs as described in textbooks,
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and they represent expenditures that may become signi&cant also in a national
context. For example, bottom-up studies based on engineer s knowledge of the
costs and the potentials for new technologies often point out that there may be
substantial no-regret options to reduce CO2 emissions. The startling question
of why seemingly pro&table investments are not undertaken may partly be ex-
plained by adjustment costs. In the case of climate policy, also governmental
expenditures, such as the establishment of monitoring and control authorities,
could be considered as resources foregone in the e¤orts to reduce emissions.
Most economic studies of climate change focus on reductions in CO2 emis-
sions. The Kyoto agreement adds, however, &ve gases, which are expected to
contribute to approximately 30 percent of greenhouse gas emissions in the fu-
ture, if the contribution from emissions are calculated over 100 years. E¤orts
to &nd alternatives to these emissions are picking up, and in some cases the
propects for reducing the emissions of non-CO2 gases at low costs with new
technologies seem to be promising. Although investments in abatement of these
gases are lower than for CO2, the options may be important for single investors.
Emissions of these gases have, however, been a free good till now, and a signi&-
cant research in &nding appropriate technological solutions remains to be done.
The adjustment costs are therefore indisputable.
External adjustment costs accrue in cases where &rms are monopsonists in
the capital market. The external adjustment costs cannot therefore be measured
directly, but represent certain market e¤ects of the investments. It is di¢cult to
say whether external adjustment costs will occur as a result of investments in
climate policy. However, external costs may accrue if the investments are under-
taken by public authorities, for instance as costs of public funds. In a number
of cases, an implementation of climate policy may involve public investments,
especially for reductions in other gases than CO2. The emissions of these gases
are seldom related directly to market transactions, such as for CO2 where the
bulk of emissions is attached to the use of fossil fuels. Hence, direct measures,
or public investments, may apply, but imply certain additional costs if &nanced
by public funds. In the present study, we analyse the e¤ects of adjustment costs
in a general context, and leave to later studies to provide realistic estimates of
such costs.
Another property of investments, which distinguishes them from intermedi-
ate input in the production of goods and services, is that they represent sunk
costs to some extent. Investment decisions cannot therefore be based on past
and present evidence only, but must build on the expectations of the investors.
Because of the uncertainty about future costs and incomes, one will have to con-
sider the possibility that the investment turns out more or less bene&cial than
expected. While the possibility of higher pro&ts than expected seldom (but
sometimes) causes great problems, the possibility of a loss may be disasterous.
The investor runs the risk of getting stuck with a huge capital cost and a low
value of the capital stock.
A large share of the costs spent on climate measures involve investments
with di¤erent degrees of irreversibility. Investments in new technologies with
the only motive to cut emissions, cannot be replaced without costs if climate
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change turns out to be less devastating than expected. The vast uncertainties
related to climate change need no further documentation. The possibility that
the value of invested capital in abatement will be lower than expected is therefore
signi&cant.
In this study, all the reductions of CO2 emissions are a result of investments.
This is of course a simpli&cation of the real life. For example, enhancement of
sinks may be restricted to just let forests grow, a decision that may be redone
immediately if one regrets. A tax on emissions of greenhouse gases may lead to
adjustments in behaviour without major investments. Individuals may adjust
back costlessly if the tax is withdrawn.
3 Optimal investments in climate measures
Adjustment costs and irreversibility have been analysed within two traditions
of investment theory. Yoshikawa [19], Hayashi [8] and Abel [3] discuss the
consequences of adjustment costs in a macroeconomic setting, and show that
adjustment costs provide a rigorous basis for Tobin s so-called q-theory of capital
[17]. McDonald and Siegel [12] and Pindyck [16] were the &rst to show how
sensitive the investment decision is to uncertainty when subject to complete
irreversibility. They base their results on the theory of optimal stopping, and
Dixit and Pindyck [6] give a thorough presentation of di¤erent applications of
the theories. Lucas and Prescott [10] include the irreversibility aspect in a model
with adjustment costs. However, the &rst attempt to unify the two aspects were
provided by Abel and Eberly [4], who analyse irreversible investments with
adjustment costs in relation to the value of capital (Tobin s q). This allows the
investment decision to be included in a set of macroeconomic relations, which
is the track I follow in this paper.
The macroeconomic model is basically a version of the Ramsey-model which
optimises the welfare of future consumption under given constraints on the
state-variables. De&ne the value function
V (k1; k2;S;t) = max
x;y
E
Z 1
t
u(xs)e¡±sds: (1)
k1denotes the stock of real capital used for production of goods and services
(productive capital), k2 is the stock of abatement capital, and S is an indicator
for the state of the environment. Subscripts for time are omitted for convenience.
For instance, S might denote the level of concentrations of greenhouse gases in
the atmosphere above the natural, or stable, level. This is usually de&ned as the
concentrations in parts per million (ppmv) above the level from pre-industrial
times. u(xs) is the atemporal utility of consumption level x at time s, and
± is the consumers pure rate of impatience. To achieve an optimal solution,
the decision makers control the consumption level and the cost of investing in
abatement, y. At t = 0, k1; k2 and S are known to the decision maker.
The stock of productive capital develops according to the relation between
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production and allocation of the net national product in a closed economy,
dk1t = [f (k1t ; St) ¡ xt ¡ yt]dt: (2)
The net national product, f (k1t ; St); is a function of the stock of productive
capital and the concentrations of greenhouse gases. Hence, f 0S < 0, can be
interpreted as the marginal damage cost of climate change.
(2) implies that investments in productive capital is modelled in the stan-
dard neo-classical way, with no adjustment costs. For abatement measures, we
assume that adjustment costs are present. Investments in abatement capital
add to the stock of abatement capital and depreciates by rate ° . Hence,
dk2t = (it ¡ °k2t)dt
where i denotes the added stock of abatement capital. To add i to the capital
stock, the investor will have to pay adjustment costs. The adjustment cost
function proposed by Abel and Eberly [4] is applied here. It contains a constant
term, C; which accrues if the investments in abatement is non-zero at t, but is
zero if investments are zero. In other words, since one cannot decide an in&nitely
small investment without paying the constant amount C, there is a lower limit
for the investment capital to be installed at each point in time.
In addition to the constant term, some adjustment costs also depend on the
volume of investment, i, and on the capital stock at t. Hence, total abatement
costs at t, if investments are non-zero, can be written as yt = c(it ; k2t; C ). The
dependency of the volume of new investments is related to the utilisation of the
capacity of the economy at the time of investments. We therefore assume that
c0i > 0, and c00ii > 0, while c(it ; k2t ; C) may either be increasing or decreasing in
k2t.
If there is no investments in abatement capital, all costs are zero. The &xed
term C causes a discontinuity in the cost function at i = 0, which can be
represented in the abatement cost function by a dummy, º t, where ºt = 0 when
it = 0 and vt = 1 else. Adjustment cost can thereby be written as
yt = ºtc(it ; k2t ; C); (3)
which is called the augmented cost function.
Note that in order to have positive investments, marginal costs will have to
exceed average costs, i.e. c0i > ¹c. In principle, the investments may be both
positive and negative. If the demand for new equipment is strictly positive,
it > 0, the value of abatement capital needs to exceed the minimum price
required to cover the average total investment costs, ¹c. Denote the price of
purchasing abatement capital by p+. Because of the uncertainty, it may be
optimal to sell parts of the installed capital stock if climate change turns out to
be less severe than expected, that is it < 0. The price obtained for previously
installed capital in the second hand market, p¡ cannot exceed the price of new
capital. Hence, we must have p+ ¸ p¡.
We may interprete the di¤erence between p+ and p¡ as the degree of ir-
reversibility , since it represents the immediate loss imposed on the investor if
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the value of the abatement capital turns out lower than expected. The value of
equipment in the second hand market will usually be positive, even for abate-
ment capital. To keep the structure of the model as simple as possible, however,
we assume that abatement capital is completely irreversible, that is, p¡t = 0; 8t.1
Irreversibility thereby represents a second discrete element in the abatement cost
function. Since we limit this study to the case of total irreversibility, we may
include this aspect by rede&ning the dummy º t, such that º t = 0 when it · 0
and vt = 1 else.
The accumulation of abatement capital, dk2t = it ¡°k2t can be found by in-
verting the augmented adjustment cost function (3). We write i = ©(ºt ; yt ; k2t).
The signs of the derivatives of ©(ºt ; yt; k2t) follows from the assumptions about
the shape of c(it; k2t; C ), that is, ©0y > 0 and ©00yy < 0 when y > 0, and zero
when y = 0. ©02 depends on whether there are economies of scale in abatement
capital. The restrictions on the augmented adjustment cost function implies
that ©(º t; yt; k2t) = 0 when º = 0. We assume that abatement capital evolves
according to
dk2t = ©(ºt;yt ; k2t)dt: (4)
For simplicity, we assume that greenhouse gases accumulate in atmosphere
with a constant rate of decay equal to ®.2 St evolves according to a stochastic
process,
dSt = [®St + g(k1t; k2t)]dt + ¾sStdzt: (5)
® is the rate of decay, which expresses the lifetime for the greenhouse gas in the
atmosphere ( ¡1 < ® < 0). For gases with long life-times, ® is close to 0, which
means that anthropogenic emissions accumulate in the atmosphere. In the case
of CO2, the natural decay of concentrations depends on the carbon cycles, and
the assumption of a constant decay rate is a very rough one, indeed. It will,
however, be sustained because we want to focus primarily on the investment
decision. g(k1t ;k2t) is the anthropogenic emissions, generated by economic ac-
tivities. We assume that g01 > 0, and g02 < 0. The stochastic term dzt is normally
distributed, with E(dzt) = 0, and ¾s is an expression for the standard deviation
of the stochastic process. By its direct contribution to damages in the produc-
tion function, the stochastic evolution of St can be interpreted as uncertainty
in the damage costs.
Denote by Xi state variable i (= k1;k2; S). Then, the Hamilton-Jacoby-
Bellman equation is:
0 = max
x;y;º
Ef[u(xt)e¡±t + V 0t ]dt +
X
i
V 0i dXi +
1
2
X
i
X
j
V 00ijdXidXjg:
1 The model applied here could be extended to include the case of partly reversible invest-
ments by setting an exogenous p¡ which could be thought of as a price of scrapped equipment
on the world market, and include the value of sold equipment in the national product.
2S is an indicator for the potential for damages of climate change, which is closely related
to the concentrations of CO2 in the atmosphere. The decay of CO2 concentrations depends
on the cabon cycles, which cannot properly be represented by constant decay rate. A constant
decay rate for all emissions must therefore be taken as a very rough approximation.
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In the last term, we have Edk21 = Edk22 = Edk1dk2 = Edk1dS = Edk2dS = 0.
By Ito s formulae, EdS2 = (¾sS)2dt. Denote by V 0i the derivative of the value
function with respect to state variable i. To simplify notation, we write V 01 for
the derivative with respect to k1, and V 02 for the derivative with respect to k2:
Insert this, (2), (4) and (5) into the Hamilton-Jacoby-Bellman equation, and
take expectations. Then, we obtain:
0 = max
x;y;º
Ef[u(x)e¡±t + V 0t ] + V 01 [f (k1; S) ¡ x ¡ y]
+V 02©(º; y; k2) + V
0
S [®S + g(k1; k2)] +
(¾sS)2
2
V 00SS ; (6)
where we have dropped the time indicator, t. Maximisation of (6) with respect
to x and y gives:
u0xe
¡±t = V 01 ; (7)
and
V 02©
0
y = V
0
1 : (8)
The partial derivatives of V (k1; k2; S; t) express the marginal contribution,
or the shadow prices, of the state variables to the value of the system at t.
(7) states that the marginal contribution from productive capital is equal to
the marginal value of consumption at all points in time. ©0y measures how
much abatement capital will be installed on the margin by a dollar invested in
abatement. In other words, (8) is the familiar &rst order condition, that if it is
decided to make investments in abatement, a dollar spent on either capital type
has to yield the same social bene&t on the margin. The decision maker equates
the marginal cost of adding abatement capital and the social price of abatement
capital V 01=V
0
2 . This corresponds to Tobin s q-theory of capital, and as Abel and
Eberly [4] point out, the investment decision is thereby made without directly
considering the uncertainty. The uncertainty is, however, re! ected in the price
of abatement capital, which is subject to market conditions.
Because of the shift parameter º t ; also the capital installation function
©(º t; yt; k2t) is discontinuous at y = 0. The decision maker will have to make
a discrete choice as to whether to invest in abatement capital or not. Since
new abatement capital must be expected to give a positive contribution to the
system, (8) applies if and only if the expected return of new investments is
positive. To assure optimality, the value of new abatement capital therefore has
to be at least as high as the average cost of investments. To detemine the value
of the shift parameter, de&ne ~y as the value of y determined by (8) given k2t;
and º = 1. Then we have
º = 0 when q2 < c=~y (9)
º = 1 when q2 ¸ c=~y
(9) gives the critical value at which the switch from non-action to action is
determined. For a thorough analysis of the range of inaction , see Abel and
Eberly [4] and Dixit and Pindyck [6].
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(7), (8) and (9) can be regarded as atemporal conditions. For given prices,
the level of consumption and abatement costs can be read directly. The atem-
poral conditions also give a direct answer to how adjustment costs a¤ect the
investment decision. The impact of uncertainty and irreversibility depends on
how the system evolves over time, which is determined by the intertemporal
conditions: The investment decision at t; given the optimal stock of abatement
capital at t are made on the basis of the expectations at t. If a stochastic event
occurs before t + ¢t, which contributes to a reduction in the value of k2, the
stock of abatement capital is too large compared with the cases of certainty
or perfect foresight, thereby pushing the value of abatement capital down. Irre-
versibility means that the e¤ect of this event will last for a longer period than
if the capital stock can be adjusted immediately.
The intertemporal conditions can be found by a two-step proceedure (see e.g.
Pindyck [15]). First, we take the derivative of (6) with respect to each of the
state variables, multiply through by dt and insert for the expected evolutions of
k1, k2 and S:
0 = [(u0xx01e¡±t + V 0 0t1)dt + V
00
11dk1 + V 01 (f 01 ¡ x01 ¡ y01)dt + V 021dk2
+V 02©
0
yy
0
1dt + V
00
S1EdS + V
0
Sg
0
1dt +
(¾ sS)2
2
V 000SS1];
0 = [(u0xx
0
2e
¡±t + V 00t2)dt + V
00
12dk1 + V
0
1(¡x02 ¡ y02)dt + V 022dk2
+V 02[©02 + ©0yy02]dt + V 00S2EdS + V 0Sg02dt +
(¾sS)2
2
V 000SS2];
0 = [(u0xx
0
Se
¡±t + V 00tS )dt + V
0
1Sdk1 + V
0
1 (f
0
S ¡ x0S ¡ y0S)dt + V
00
2Sdk2
+V 02©
0
yy
0
Sdt + V
00
SSEdS + V
0
S®dt +
(¾sS)2
2
V 000SSS + ¾
2SV 00SS ]:
The second step aims at &nding an expression for the transition probabilities for
each of these di¤usions. Since V 0i (i = k1; k2 and S) are solutions of a stochastic
di¤erential equation, they are themselves stochastic integrals for which the drift
and di¤usion coe¢cients are continuous in t (see e.g. Milliaris and Brock [13]).
We may therefore assign an in&nitesimal operator to each of them. In general
terms, the in&nitesimal operator is
AG(S) = G0S + G0t + 12G
00
SSdS2
The transition probabilities can be expressed implicitly by the expected value
at t of V 0i for some future point in time t +¢t. According to Dynkin s formulae,
the expected value at t = 0 for a di¤usion at ¿ can be expressed as
EG(S¿ ; ¿) = G(S0; 0) + E
Z ¿
0
AG(S; s)ds
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If we choose t = ¿ , the function u(S; t) = EG(St;t) is di¤erentiable wrt. t, and
by Kolmogorov s backward eqation, we have
@u
@t
= Au
where the right hand side is to be interpreted as A applied on S (Øksendal [14]).
The in&nitesimal operator for V 0i , Avi , can be expressed as
Avi = [V 0 0it dt + V 00i1dk1 + V 00i2dk2 + V 00iSEdSt + (¾S)
2
2
V 000iSSdt] (10)
By use of Kolmogorov s backward equation, which implies that Avi = @@ t [V 0i ];
and replacing for V 00it dt in the partial derivatives of the HJB-eqation above, we
get,3
@
@t
[V 01] = ¡[u0xx01e¡±t + V 01 (f 01 ¡ x01 ¡ y01) + V 02©0yy01 + V 0Sg01]; (11)
@
@t
[V 02 ] = ¡[u0xx02e¡± t + V 01 (¡x02 ¡ y02) + V 02(©02 + ©0yy02) + V 0Sg02]; (12)
@
@t
[V 0S ] = ¡[u0xx0Se¡± t + V 01 (f 0S ¡ x0S ¡ y0S ) + V 02©0yy0S + V 0S® + ¾2SV 00SS ]: (13)
where x0i and y0i denotes the partial derivative of the optimal consumption and
optimal abatement costs with respect to state variable i.
Finally, replace V 0i by the &rst order conditions (7) and (8), and divide
through by V 01 ; V
0
2; and V
0
S respectively. Then the rate of change in the value of
the state variables, or the discount rates, can be expressed as:
½1 = ¡
@
@ t [V
0
1]
V 01
= f 01 +
V 0S
V 01
g01; (14)
½2 = ¡
@
@t [V
0
2 ]
V 02
=
V 0S
V 01
©0yg
0
2 + ©
0
2; (15)
½S = ¡
@
@t [V
0
S]
V 0S
=
V 01
V 0S
f 0S + ® + ¾
2S
V 00SS
V 0S
; (16)
which are the intertemporal optimum conditions for the values of productive
capital, abatement capital and the concentrations of greenhouse gases when
there is uncertainty about the damage. They depend on the unknown terms V
0
S
V 01
3 Note that the term G0t in the expression for the in&nitesimal operator includes the time
derivatives of non-stochastic variables (k1 and k2), and that the function u(S; t) is not the
same as V 00it when applied on V 0i :
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and V
00
SS
V 0S
. V
0
S
V 01
can be interpreted as the relative (shadow) price of greenhouse gas
concentrations. V
00
SS
V 0S
is an expression for the curvature of the value function,
that is, it expresses how sensitive the optimal solution is to variations in the
concentrations of greenhouse gases.
(14) is the social return on productive capital. It contains the direct marginal
productivity of capital in production subtracted by the relative value of emis-
sions of greenhouse gases. Hence, the social return on capital is lower than the
private return. This may justify e.g. taxation of emissions.
The main component of the return on abatement capital, given by (15), is
the value of marginal emission cuts resulting from an additional dollar spent
on abatement. The adjustment costs enter this expression by how productive
abatement costs are in terms of investments in abatement capital. A small
adjustment is also made for possible economies of scale in abatement capital.
It should be noted that the return on productive capital and abatement capi-
tal are determined by widely di¤erent components. Hence, they are generally
not equal. The relationship between them depends, inter alia, on the optimal
path for investments in abatement determined by the intertemporal equilibrium
conditions developed below.
The only term in which uncertainty comes in directly is condition (16), which
characterises the path for the shadow value of greenhouse gas concentrations.
Note that without uncertainty, ½S may be negative since ® and f 0S both are
negative. By its impact on the path of V 0S; uncertainty a¤ects the value of
productive capital and abatement capital indirectly. Since V
0
S
V 01
and V
00
SS
V 0S
are
unknown, we cannot say in what direction and how much so far. However, we
can match the atemporal and the intertemporal optimum conditions in order to
&nd the intertemporal equilibrium conditions under which the optimal solution
evolves. According to (7), the derivative of V 01 with respect to the time indicator
is
@
@t
[u0xe¡±t ] = [u00xx _x ¡ ±u0x ]e¡±t :
De&ne ¹x = ¡xu00xx=u0x , which is the inverse of the elasticity of substitution
of consumption over time. Insert this and divide through by V 01 to obtain the
intertemporal equilibrium condition for the discount rate of productive capital
½1 = ¹x
_x
x
+ ±; (17)
which is the familiar Ramsey rule for optimal economic growth. The di¤erence
between (17) and the standard rule is only the deduction for the social loss of
emissions due to higher concentrations of greenhouse gases included in ½1.
In a similar way, we can &nd the path of the value for abatement capital, or
the discount rate for abatement capital, by the derivative of (8) w.r.t. time.
@
@t
[V 02] =
[ @@t [V
0
1 ]©0y + V 01©0 0yy _y]
(©0y)2
:
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De&ne ¹y = y©00yy=©0y; which characterises the curvature of the abatement cost
function, and divide through by V 02. Then,
½2 = ¹y
_y
y
+ ½1 (when º = 1); (18)
which leads us closer to an answer of how abatement capital is to be discounted
compared with productive capital: The discount rates are equal only if it is
optimal to keep the level of abatement costs constant over time. Generally, this
is not the case unless it is optimal not to investment in abatement (º t = 08t).
The result is therefore intuitive: The discount rate for state variables, such as
concentrations of greenhouse gases, equals the social economic rate of return
only if it is optimal not to invest in climate measures. In other words, to apply
the economic rate of return to discount bene&ts from climate policy is indeed
based on marginal considerations.
Another case in which ºt = 0 is along an optimal path where abatement is
positive at some t, but may be zero because q2 < c=~y. If so, we cannot take
the derivative of (8), because ©0y = 0. The value of abatement capital is, then,
determined by the exisiting stock of abatement capital. The evolution of V 02
when ºt = 0 is found by optimising the system with respect to x, given that
y = 0, and k2 > 0. Then,
½2 = ©
0
2
_k2 +
V 0S
V 02
g02 (when v = 0): (19)
(18) and (19) will generally lead to a discount rate for abatement measures
widely di¤erent from the economic rate of return. This relates to the optimal
timing of action, which is di¤erent in the case of traditional economic invest-
ments and the case of investments in climate measures. For example, it is shown
in Wigly, Richels and Edmonds [18] and Aaheim [2] that the social gain of post-
poning abatement e¤orts may be considerable. The reason is that signi&cant
damages of climate change will probably not occur for many years. Hence, the
gains of aggressive actions are much higher in the future than they are now.
Meanwhile, it is better to partly invest in productive capital and partly con-
sume.
It has been held against this argument that future e¤ects of climate change
are uncertain. Hence, we do not know whether signi&cant damages will hap-
pen in the short, medium or long term. The question is then how to allocate
abatement e¤orts under uncertainty. To answer this question, we have to &nd
a numerical solution of the model.
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4 A numerical approximation
To achieve a numerical representation of the model, we have to &nd approxima-
tions of the unknown terms V
0
S
V 01
and V
00
SS
V 0S
. Recall that from (14) we have:
V 0S =
V 01 (½1 ¡ f 01)
g01
: (20)
To approximate V
00
SS
V 0S
we assume that, over a short time interval, V 0S can be
approximated by &rst order, i.e. V 0S = a+bS.
4 Then V 00SS = b. From (14) we can
assign the following values to the parameters: a = ½1V
0
1
g 01
, and b = ¡ f 01V 01g01S : Given
that these fractions can be regarded as constant over the interval (t; t + ¢t), we
can write
V 0SS
V 0S
¼ 1
(1 ¡ ½1f 01 )S
(21)
Inserting (21) into (16) we can write the discount rate for the value of greenhouse
gas concentrations as
½S =
V 01
V 0S
f 0S + ® +
¾2
1 ¡ ½1f 01
The model has two control variables and three state variables. We may eliminate
½S from the system by requiring that in intertemporal equilibrium, the time
derviative V 0S in (20) has to be equal to ½S . The time-derivative of the right
hand side of (20) divided through by V 0S yields
½S = ½1 +
_½1 ¡ [f 001t + f 0011 _k1 + f 001S _S]
½1 ¡ f 01 ¡
g0011
g01
_k1: (22)
To simplify expressions for the numerical calculations, we assume that _½1 =
Äx
x ¡ ( _xx)2 is negligible. Then, equating the right hand sides of (16) and (22) we
&nd
V 0S
V 01
¼
f 0S ¡ Ag01
½1 +
g0011
g01
_k1 ¡ (® + ¾21¡ ½1f01
)
(23)
where
A = f 001t + f
00
11
_k1 + f 001S _S:
4 From the expression for V 0S we see that there are alternatives to this. We have tried to
make the assumption about constant a and b as correct as possible. The numerical calculations
indicate an error in the interval -4 to 1 percent, clearly biased towards underestimating V 0S .
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For simplicity we have assumed that the e¤ect on emissions of abatement is
independent on the level of production, e.g. additive, such that g0012 = 0 ( end
of pipe -solutions).
(14), (15), (23), (17) and (18) or (19) allow us to solve the variables ½1;½2;
V 01
V 0S
; _xx
and _yy . Thereby, we have su¢cient conditions to solve the evolution of the opti-
mal solution over time, or the intertemporal equilibrium. Adding the atemporal
optimum conditions, we can assess the optimal control. To do a numerical anal-
ysis, we need initial and terminal conditions on the state variables. The initial
values of productive capital, abatement capital and greenhouse gas concentra-
tions are assumed to be known. For the terminal period, T , we apply a weak
form of strong sustainability (see Asheim, [5] and Aaheim, [1]) requiring that
V 010k10 + V
0
20k20 = V
0
1T k1T + V
0
2T k2T
and
V 0S0S0 = V
0
ST ST
The two conditions imply that we do not allow the present value of the capital
stock to be lower in the terminal period than the initial value. The same applies
for the value of concentrations of greenhouse gases. This limits the possibility
to substitute between real capital and greenhouse gas concentrations.
The system evolves according to a stochastic process, which means that
the level of the shadow prices, especially on concentrations, change as new
information is gained. The two conditions above is therefore determined the
&rst year, and the physical end points are sustained after the &rst year. This
condition of sustainability is rather strong, and requires that irrespective of how
the world develops, the sustainability criterion refers to one &xed year (t = 0).
An alternative could be to relate the value of each component of wealth (real
capital and greenhouse gas concentrations) to the year in which the decisions
are made. Note also that the condition is somewhat arti&cial, since it does not
involve any evaluation of the present. To evaluate the present in the light of
sustainability is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.
The numerical model &nds an optimal decision at each point in time. The
optimality conditions developed above are based on continuous time, which
means that rate of the change of each variable from t to t + ¢t has to be
approximated. For this purpose, I have used a 2nd order Taylor expansion for
each state, and for each control variable. The optimal solution follows from
inital choices of consumption, x, and price of abatement capital, q2, at each
starting year, for example t = 0; which is the &rst year a decision is made. The
optimal levels of x and q2 at t = 0 are determined by means of the end points,
where sustainability is required, and is based on the information available at
t = 0. The same procedure is followed the next year when new information
has arrived, i.e. when dz0 is known. Under full certainty, the decisions for
years after t = 0 coincide with the optimal paths evaluated at t = 0, since no
new information occurs later. This can be called the perfect foresight solution.
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Figure 1: Initial and terminal &gures in four alternatives
Without perfect foresight, a stochastic event occurs between t and t + ¢t. For
example, when damages are uncertain, St+¢t turns out di¤erent from what was
expected at t. Adjusting for this new information, we then have to develop new
paths for x and y in order to decide xt+¢t and yt+¢t .
5 Results
The chocie of functionals of the model are shown in the appendix. The welfare
function is log-linear, with factor equal to 0.125, and a time correction factor
( rate of impatience ) equal og 0.02. The model was calibrated with reference
to data for Norway. The production function is a Cobb-Douglas function with
real capital as only input. It was calibrated on the basis of a real return of 6
percent. Damage from climate change are assumed quadratic with a production
loss of 2 percent of GNP at 2£CO2. The abatement cost function is also on
the Cobb-Douglas form of installed equipment and stock of abatement capital,
except that a constant term is added. The parameter for installation was set to
1.2, and -0.005 for the stock. The constant term is 0.25, i.e. 250 mill NOK in
the base year.
The life-time of CO2; ®, was set to 1/120. The emissions coe¢cient were
calibrated using emissions of CO2 in Norway, while the parameteres for emission
cuts were based on the assumption that the cost of 10 percent reduction of
emissions amounts to 0.9 percent of GNP, while 30 percent reductions amounts
to 3 percent of GNP. Note that adjustment costs add to these. The link between
Norwegian emissions and concentrations of greenhouse gases are based on equal
percentage cuts all over the world (see Aaheim [1] for a closer discussion).
The model were run over a period of 50 years, and table 1, column 1 shows
the results of the main variables of interest in the reference case under full
certainty. The optimal consumption level is 469 in year 0 and rises at a rate
of approximately 2.5 percent per year to 1318 in year 51. Abatement starts at
6.37 bill NOK and rises to 415 bill NOK in year 50. This means that emissions
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Figure 2: Abatement decisions with stochastic damage
are approximately zero in year 51, and concentrations rises from 356 to 464.
The price of abatement capital rises relative to the price of real productive
capital over the entire period, which is re! ected by the discount rates. For real
capital the discount rate starts at 5 percent an falls to 3.75 percent in year
51. For abatement capital it starts at 2 percent and rises to nearly 3 percent.
Hence, abatement is gradually more emphasised over the entire period, making
investments in abatement exponentially increasing.
Uncertainty was introduced by setting ¾S = 0:02: Roughly speaking, this
implies that the standard deviation of annual correction of the concentrations
level due to new information amounts to 2 ppmv. Column 2 to 4 in table 1
shows results for the expected optimal paths used as the basis for the decision
at t = 0. The initial level of optimal abatement costs in the uncertain reference
case falls substantially relative to the case of certainty (column 2 in table 1),
starting at 1.88 bill NOK. It also implies a higher initial consumption level, but
a somewhat slower growth. The element of postponing abatement is stronger
under uncertainty, and the abatement costs in year 51 is higher than under
certainty. Still, total abatement for the entire period is lower, and the expected
level of concentration in year 51 is 506 ppmv; more than 40 ppmv higher than
under certainty. The change of the abatement pro&le is re! ected in the paths
for the price of abatement capital, which starts at 1.30, and ends up at 3.21
relative to the price of real capital. Under certainty the &gures are 1.62 and
3.16.
How sensitive the decision at t = 0 is for changes in abatement costs is also
shown in table 1. Limitation of abatement options can be illustrated by a more
rapidly increasing abatement cost curve. The result is that abatement shifts
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Figure 3: Evolution of states
towards earier action, in order to level out di¤erences in abatement costs over
time. Hence, the initial price of abatement capital is higher at t = 0, than in the
uncertain reference case. It is also somewhat higher at t = 51, but has fallen at
a higher rate, and the expected concentrations are higher, 520, vs. 506 ppmv.
The sensitivity to adjustment costs mainly results in a shift from abatement to
consumption when adjustment costs increases. The exception is an increase in
the constant term. Increasing the constant term from 250 mill NOK to 800 mill
NOK resulted in a substantial postponement of abatement. With the exception
of year 9, the price of abatement capital is below the lower limit the &rst 12
years, leaving the decision maker in the range of inaction. When abatement
picks up, the activity is relatively high, starting at 5 and ends at 449 bill NOK
in year 51. As a consequence, the concentrations are 520 in t = 51, which not
much higher than in the uncertain reference case.
These results indicate that taking adjustment costs into account may change
the pro&le of abatement rather much, but that the level of abatment is more
dependent on uncertainty than on the size of the adjustment costs. The question
remains as to what extent irreversibility may a¤ect the solution. To see this,
we have to develop a stochastic path for concentrations and compare it with
the case of perfect foresight, on which the results in table 1, applicable for the
decision at t = 0, are based.
Figures 2 to 4 show the evolution of states, optimal abatement and the re-
lation between state and price of abatement capital in the uncertain reference
case, and two alternative stochastical evolutions of states, alternatives A and
B. The two alternatives di¤er only with respect to the stochastic events that
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Figure 4: Value of abatement capital with stochastic damage
occur at each point in time. The characteristics of the solution can be traced
after a few number of years, and we have therefore limited the time series to 10
years with decision making. The terminal year of all the decisions is, however,
year 52 (2047). In both the stochastic cases, the damages turn out more serious
than expected at t = 0; but in alt 9 the damages are gradually downgraded,
and assumed lower than expected towards the end. To the extent that irrevesi-
bility matters, the overinvestments in previous periods should then lead to a
reduction in the price of abatement capital. However, as seen from &gure 3, the
investments follow the evolution of states remarkably well. A slight indication
of irreversibitily can be found in years 7, when the concentrations are a little
higher in the stochastic alt. 9 than in the perfect foresight case, but abatement
costs are exactly the same. Another illustration of the possible e¤ect of irre-
versibility can be found by comparing concentrations and q2. see &gure 4. A
high e¤ect of irreversibility would result in a substantially lower q2 for the same
year with approximately the same level of concentrations if there had been over-
investments in earlier years. However, this e¤ect is hard to discover in &gure 4.
If concentrations are higher, the value of abatement capital is generally higher,
and previous investments seem to have very little in! uence. This conforms with
other studies of irreversibility, see e.g. Kolstad (1994) and Brekke and Lystad
(1999).
6 Conclusions
Investments in the abatement of emissions of greenhouse gases are subject to
extreme uncertainty, and may require substantial adjustment costs in order to
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be initiated. Optimal investments is characterised by the level of investments at
each point in time, and by the investment pro&le over time. This paper studies
the possible impact of uncertainty and adjustment costs on these characteristics
of investments. The model applied in the paper leads to substantially lower
investments as response to an increase of the uncertainty. This conclusions may
be model speci&c and is explained by the way intertemporal welfare changes
according to di¤erent outcomes of climate damage under optimal policy.
Adjustment costs do not a¤ect the level of abatement substantially, but may
be important for the investment pro&le. It was found that higher acceleration
of costs as abatement increases advances abatement e¤orts. The total costs
may turn out higher, but the amount of emission cuts goes down. High &xed
costs makes it worthwhile to wait with an initiation of abatement. However,
the level of abatement is somewhat higher than in the case of lower &xed costs,
and hence, and the concentrations thereby turn out approximately the same.
Several studies have examined the role of irreversible costs with the use
of alternative models. The present model uses a new model based on Abel
and Eberly s (1994) approach, which uni&es the analysis of abatement costs
and irreversibility. The impact of irrevesibility on the abatement decisions was
found to be very small. The same conclusion is, in general, found also in other
studies.
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comments.
19
A APPENDIX: Choice of functions
Social intertemporal welfare according to ordinary logaritmic stationary welfare:
V = max E
Z 1
t
Ax®e¡±sds
where A > 0; 0 < ® < 1; ± > 0: The choices in the reference case are ( A =
1; ® = 0:15; ± = 0:02)
The production function is Cobb-Douglas , with damage de&ned with ref-
erence to rate of damage, d, at 2£CO2 (560 ppm), with exponent ": Rate of
technological advancement is ´
f (k1t ; St ; t) = B(1 ¡ d( j St ¡ 280 j280 )
")e´tk¯1
where B > 0; d > 0; " > 1; ´ > 0; 0 < ¯ < 1: The choices in the reference case
are (B = 34; 3745; d = 0:02; " = 2; ´ = 0:015; ¯ = :386254).
The adjustment cost for investments in abatement capital is
c(it ; k2t) = i
¹1
t k
¹2
2t + C
where ¹1 ¸ 1; ¹2 · 0; C ¸ 0 (there may be arguments also for ¹2 > 0). The
choices in the reference cases are (¹1 = 1:3;¹2 = ¡0:001; C = 0:5).
Emissions converge emissions from production directly to concentrations of
CO2 :
g(k1t ; k2t) = G1k¯1t ¡ G2k·2t
where G1 > 0; G2 > 0; 0 < · · 1: The choices in the reference case were
G1 = xx; G2 = 0:02843; · = 0:6826:
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